(This has been quite a week for natural law thought, what with Princeton philosopher Robert George featured in a New York Times Magazine spread and all. That excellent spread raised a lot of commentary, including a response by homosexual Catholic and erstwhile conservative Andrew Sullivan, excoriating George at his blog for The Atlantic. That commentary was sent to me by a leftist friend with the simple question, “thoughts?” in the subject header. It seemed only natural [pun intended] to put those first-reaction “thoughts” for my friend out there for the world to see.)
As you know from previous discussions, I prefer to let the adversary do the talking, so in response to Sullivan’s quotes:
“There does seem something intuitively right about seeing our ‘nature’ as some sort of guide to the way we should live our lives.”
OK, here’s where he goes wrong. Sullivan is a voluntarist at heart, much like most Western thinkers in recent centuries. He continually defines the “natural” based on what feels right, what occurs in the absence of coercion to the contrary, and what people want to do. When he asks…
“What do we mean by nature? How do emotion and reason interact? How precise and universal can we be in adducing morals from something as diverse and varied as the fruits of natural selection? How can we be sure we aren’t smuggling in all sorts of pre-existing views of what nature is and what morality is when we declare something “unnatural”? How does an argument that designates an entire sub-section of humankind as inherently immoral square with the goodness of God’s creation or the morally neutral power of Darwin’s theory?”
…he’s saying that we mean things that happen by “nature.” He’s implying that emotion and reason interact in such a way that an emotion is an a priori good, justified by instrumental reasoning after the fact (equally true whether it’s homosexuals who employ reasoning to justify their sex lives or heterosexuals who employ reasoning because they want to oppress “the other”). He’s saying that we start with the fruits of natural selection, then adduce morals from them based on what we want/what feels right to us/what empowers us/what we will to do. He’s saying that we do smuggle in “pre-existing views” of nature (he’s kind of correct on that one, and I’ll come back to this in a minute). And he’s saying that an entire sub-section of humankind who wants to do something should be condoned in doing so unless it infringes on someone else’s general liberty, either through God or Darwin.
The problem is that Sullivan’s argument starts with will as the basis for liberty, and looks for ways to justify what we want to do once we’ve determined what it is that we want. George (and I) are intellectual supremacists, arguing that reason has to be the king of the will a la Aristotle and most Western thinkers prior to the so-called Enlightenment. In a nutshell, just because someone wants to do something by nature does not mean that this desire is in accordance with human nature. I can want to have sex with a rock, or to kill my neighbor because of his skin color. But will does not determine morality. Reason does, because reason is at the apex of human nature. Many animal natures, ours included, contain will; only human nature contains reason. Reason looks for purposes and reasonable uses of things. A reasonable use of physical strength is material work or defense of innocent people, not arbitrary violence. A reasonable use of sex that takes into account its primary effect, which is procreation, cannot justify either homosexual or other non-procreative sex.
Sure, homosexual tendencies exist in the will by nature; as Sullivan says, “even” the Vatican recognizes that. But the Vatican isn’t just interested in keeping the gay man down (no sick pun intended). It is interested in preserving the primacy of reason and not the will as the basis for moral liberty. We have all kinds of tendencies that are unnatural. Look at the tendency held by so many towards greed and materialism of the sort you rightly rail against. You acknowledge that economic liberty ought to be oriented around the purpose of fulfilling human need, and I agree with you there despite our many disagreements about the best way to do so. Natural law thinkers extend the same kind of purpose-driven liberty discerned by reason to sexuality, politics, personal choices, etc.
Sullivan is wrong to say that “sexual orientation is the critical category here, not procreation or nature as it is actually found, and the result is to retain a stigma and legal discrimination against homosexuals – simply because they are what they are.” Again, he assumes a lack of reason behind the motives of his opponents (and I don’t doubt that he’s right as far as most on the American Right go). But he sees the entire debate over homosexuality as a clash of wills, not of reasonable positions. Intellectually speaking, that makes it very hard for him to justify his position over the alternative, much though a clash of wills is par for the course in current American politics. Stigmas are not always unreasonable, even if they do condemn something many people want to do.
Finally, Sullivan raises the point that, “You’d think that Christian scholars would be intrigued to figure out the questions – what are homosexuals for? why did God create them? why did natural selection favor their persistence?” An interesting question, to be sure, but not with the assumption that whatever a person desires is an a priori moral right. The question Christian theologians would file these points under is, “Why does sin seem so right and so appealing to a creature made in the image and likeness of God?”
“A reasonable use of sex that takes into account its primary effect, which is procreation”
Absent what man naturally desires, how are we to know what the primary effect of any activity is? It seems manifest to me that sex is used by humans, and our inclinations predispose to use, sex for many things other than procreation, but that clearly comes from a voluntarist perspective that you don’t buy into. But outside such arguments, I’m struggling to find a way to determine whether procreation is the primary effect of sexual activity, or if it ought to be impermissible to use sex for anything other than its primary purpose (a poker card may be intended to be used in a game, but there doesn’t seem to be anything immoral about using it as a coaster). Can reason discover this, or are we restricted to what divine revelation and divinely guided tradition and magisteria have to say about? If reason can discover this, what are our means to figure it out?
Finally, I’m curious where the dividing lines in natures are. You lean very heavily here on a universal human nature- and yet clearly heterosexual relations are based on sexual dimorphism, with a differing nature for male and female. Then the natural law is different for them, in some small respect. Is it that hard, then to imagine that there might be homosexual nature as well, for whom the natural law will also differ? Or that there might be those whose genetics are female or male but whose nature more or less disposes them toward feminine or masculine behaviors?
A poker card is created by a human and can thus serve human purposes, even in a creative manner. Sex, on the other hand, is not created by us in terms of the idea; it is a part of our nature. We are not at liberty to use our nature as we please; we must conform our will to our proper nature. Reason can discover that proper nature for any given aspect of ourselves, such as sexuality.
A universal human nature is not contradicted by the reality that humans are both men and women. There can be a distinct male and female nature with a limited jurisdiction falling under the broader reality of human nature, just as there can be natural properties to tables and chairs that are natural but do not exclude the general properties of wood.
That is more of a starting point than an ending point, as I do not feel qualified to get into gender issues and whether there is an essentially different nature for men and women. I’ve even gone as far as taking a Harvard class on gender issues, but I still have no clear idea on where I stand about gender essentialism. Hopefully, Zach or someone else could provide some illumination as to your final paragraph and its worthwhile question.
One mistaken assumption is to presuppose that what is desired is desirable. Simply because someone desires something is no indication that the desire in question should be desired. There are certain desires that most would view as non-desirable, some examples being pedophilia and the necrophilia.
Matt’s arguments are clearly grounded in Christian assumptions, and thus presupposes a Christian context for his argument. As Sullivan is also a Catholic and this piece is designed to engage him in his recent comments, it would be safe to assume that the context for this argument is a debate within the Christian community. In such a setting, assumptions about human nature are predicated on the idea that human nature itself was somewhat damaged by the Fall. Thus human emotions are no reliable guide to what humans should do.
The poker analogy fails precisely because it presupposes that there are no rules behind the proper use of sex in the same sense as there are no rules behind the proper use of poker cards outside the context of a game of poker. That there are precisely certain rules that correspond to the excellence of poker is something that all poker players must agree on, or else they will all be playing different games entirely. The rules of ethics do not pertain to poker qua poker in the same manner that they would pertain to sex if such rules do in fact exist, but that does not prove that there are no rules or objective norms that govern the use of sex.
Your argument as to the possibility of homosexual nature seems to use the term ‘nature’ in an equivocal manner. Nature, as understood by most Catholic philosophers, can have two distinct meanings. It can 1. refer to what humans as humans tend to do. Or 2., and the most common meaning, what essential characteristics, in Aristotle’s sense of the use of essence define human beings qua human beings. On this view, there is no essential or natural difference between men and women qua humans, although there may be differences between men and women in their natures qua tendencies as men and women. This view is grounded on the assumption that the individuation of men and women is not based on matter rather than form, so thus in this view men and women are differentiated by matter and not by form or soul. If there is no distinction in essential natures between men and women, there is no obvious good reason, on your own view, to suppose there is a homosexual nature.
As far as I can tell, you argue that intellectual supremacism is correct because “reason is at the apex of human nature.” I am not sure what you mean by that.
Even assuming intellectual supremacism, however, I am not sure you are completely out of the woods. You write:
“A reasonable use of sex that takes into account its primary effect, which is procreation, cannot justify either homosexual or other non-procreative sex.”
Who is the say what a “reasonable” use of sex is? Reasonable people, it has been said, can disagree – and “reasonable” people certainly have different moral intuitions. And it will not do as an argument to enshrine one’s own intuitions as the only “reasonable” ones.
Aristotle argues in the Nicomachean Ethics for the supremacy of reason based on its unique status as the distinguishing characteristic of a human. Any sentient animal has a will, but only humans have reason. Therefore, Aristotle says, reason is the highest function of the human, and the one where humans find fulfillment (in a very literal sense of the word).
You’re right; moral intuitions aren’t enough. That’s the whole point here – we need reason. Until birth control came along, no one would have argued that sex and procreation can be separated. The two are inherently united in their natures. Reason demands that we see sex as the precursor to procreation in the same way that we see eating as the precursor to sustenance, and not merely taste, and in the same way that we see life as the precursor to happiness, and not merely indulgence. That’s the reasonable way to go, all intuitions aside.
Jo, you note rightly that describing something as according to reason does not always help to clarify what is being discussed. Before someone can describe something, one must qualify what they mean by reason, or else one might as well admit that they are grounding their belief in nothing more than mere intuition.
Reason, according to the natural law tradition that we are defending, defines the good of all humans as based on the end [telos] of mankind as such. Every activity that is done is done for the sake of something else. That which can no longer be said to be done on account of something else is said to be the proper end of that activity; that which is done for the sake of no other activity and in which activity itself terminates is the completion of activity in itself, and is thus the proper end of all activities. The proper end, that which each thing is directed towards, is the good, and that which no other good surpasses is the greatest good or happiness. Now, as all activities as activities are aimed at some good, it follows that people do not disagree as to the proper end of action, but only in the means to the end.
From what I’ve already said, it follows that if sex is an activity, sex is a proper means to the good if it is used in such a way as it conforms to this conception of the good. Now an activity is only good insofar that it is done for the sake of the good. The end proper to sexual activity is the creation of another human, but does it follow from this that any act of sex to the contrary to this end deviates from the good? Aristotle affirms in Book X that pleasure is only good insofar as that it is used to condition us to the adaptation of virtue as the proper means to the good; but he also affirms that pleasure in itself is good, though it is not ‘the’ good. Yet he affirms that the ultimate activity or human end would be construed in such a way that pleasure supervenes on it as a natural part of that activity — one’s participation in this activity would be reinforced by the pleasure one receives in performing it. I think it would follow from this that the pleasure attached to sex is a genuine good, but only insofar as someone practiced sex in accordance with its prescribed end, that is, for the use of procreation. Yet for cases of some couples that cannot have children, natural non-procreative sex in accordance with man’s telos would be useful as a means to demonstrate to other families capable of producing children the good potential in which this activity results. Non-procreative heterosexual sex would be a partial good, therefore, based on its proclivity to promote the actuality of procreation from couples capable of this, as a couple that cannot have children is a child-bearing couple in potentiality, but in potentiality that will most likely not be made actual. In a similar manner, someone who is devoted to study but not capable of advancing far, encourages and inspires those who witness them in the activity of study. The use of sex in homosexual relationships would tend to discourage the actuality of this end as homosexual couples are not even potentially child-bearing couples.
That is, it is only per accidens and not per se that the heterosexual couple that cannot have children, in fact, cannot have children. But it follows from this per se and not merely per accidens that the homosexual couple cannot be a potentially childbearing couple.
Evolution also suggests that pleasure is secondary to procreation, as natural selection would allow for incentives related to procreation and self-preservation to be quite strong. Incentives for things like sex. Not that evolution is a basis for the “ought”s of morality so much as the “is”s of pleasure and pain, but again, biology posits pleasure as a secondary incentive for the need to procreate.
“Until birth control came along, no one would have argued that sex and procreation can be separated.”
Homosexuals and oral sex predated the pill. For that matter, contraceptives of greater or less efficacy were available long before the modern era.
Seriously, man, check your privilege. Alcibiades didn’t have access to contraception.
“Aristotle argues in the Nicomachean Ethics for the supremacy of reason based on its unique status as the distinguishing characteristic of a human.”
Why is what makes us different primary or good? If what distinguishes me from the bulk of humanity is a greater propensity to do evil things, it would be foolish to indulge in that nature just because it is what distinguishes me from those things around me.
Starting with an assumption that humanity is the peak of creation and anything uniquely human must be good seems like a dubious launching point, especially if you’re trying to pin the argument on reason instead of divine revelation.
“I think it would follow from this that the pleasure attached to sex is a genuine good, but only insofar as someone practiced sex in accordance with its prescribed end, that is, for the use of procreation.”
On what basis do you assert that procreation is the only prescribed end for sex?
“homosexual couples are not even potentially child-bearing couples.”
Tell that to artificially inseminated lesbians.
“Evolution also suggests that pleasure is secondary to procreation, as natural selection would allow for incentives related to procreation and self-preservation to be quite strong.”
Evolution also suggests that forming tighter social bonds, which sex allows, is a very important practice. It also suggests that, under certain circumstances, not having children of your own and thereby being able to help protect your family’s children (who, after all, share your genetics partially, if less so than your actual children) is more important than having your own, from the perspective of the propogation of the gene.
“On what basis do you assert that procreation is the only prescribed end for sex?”
Procreation is the end of sex to the extent that sex is not the ultimate activity in which human activity culminates. Humans share the pleasure involved in sex with animals, so thus neither sex nor pleasure as pleasure is the highest good for humans. If there is a further end to sex, this end must be procreation, as sex does not terminate in the highest human activity.
“Tell that to artificially inseminated lesbians.”
That rejoinder misses the point entirely. From whom must the sperm come for the artificial insemination to occur? A male donor, of course, as women by nature do not produce semen. The same effect would be done if the potential mother in question were to engage in intercourse to produce a child. As a couple, the lesbians cannot produce a child, whereas one of the two can do so with another partner. Thus your objection fails.
“Why is what makes us different primary or good? If what distinguishes me from the bulk of humanity is a greater propensity to do evil things, it would be foolish to indulge in that nature just because it is what distinguishes me from those things around me.”
Again that misses the point. We are looking for the characteristic that is unique to humans, that which differentiates them from other animals. Their are some activities that animals enjoy over plants, such as sensation and general awareness. Any animal would generally prefer to be aware of its surroundings than not. We say this because if a human was damaged to a vegetative state, we would claim that the quality of life for this person was ruined. No one can deny that sensation and awareness are good without being a hypocrite. Just as animals enjoy such privilege over plants, rational animals such as humans enjoy the power of reason over animals. Again, no one would want to have their rational faculties damaged to such an extent that they were little better than a child or a beast, so reason would seem a genuine human good, and one that is, as far as we know, a uniquely human good.
“Homosexuals and oral sex predated the pill.” I retract my argument that no one would have argued for separation of sex and procreation prior to the invention of modern birth control. I maintain that the argument was as unreasonable then as it is now.
“Why is what makes us different primary or good? If what distinguishes me from the bulk of humanity is a greater propensity to do evil things, it would be foolish to indulge in that nature just because it is what distinguishes me from those things around me.” It is not merely what is different, but what we are capable of by nature. We are capable of reason, unlike any other beings. Your argument would only hold true if you, by nature, had the capacity for greater evil. Following from St. Augustine, though, evil does not exist independently; it is the perversion of what is good by nature. It cannot be in your nature to do evil; your nature is not evil, and to argue that it is would be to become a modern Manichean. You are welcome to argue for dualism at your own risk.
“Starting with an assumption that humanity is the peak of creation and anything uniquely human must be good seems like a dubious launching point.” Humanity is not necessarily the peak of creation; there may well be higher species in the universe without our propensity for evil. I merely argue that our highest function is the one that sets us above all other animals, which is reason.
As for the evolutionary argument, pleasure is still tied to sex, regardless of the social circumstances. The pleasure is, by nature, secondary to procreation, and it remains so regardless of extraneous particular conditions.