Modern notions of the natural law differ from the classical one in two very important respects. The first is the introduction of the concept of the state of nature, which would become practically universal in the modern setting. The second is the emphasis on individual rights in the abstract, as opposed to rights among members of a community. The natural law of the modern era undergoes a fundamental shift in the thinking of Thomas Hobbes, whose formulation of the origins of the state, along with the philosophical anthropology underlying it, was to set the stage for the discussion of natural law for the next few centuries.
Accordingly, Hobbes conceives of man as existing in a state of nature, in which the man’s lot is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” It is a period predating the establishment of the state, in which each and every man is in constant and violent conflict with one another, “a war of all against all” (bellum omnium contra omnes). Yet seeing that such conflict is unending and brutal, man opts for a compromise, an end to the perpetual fighting with his peers, through the mediation of the state. Thus the social contract is born, a compact among men in which the state is vested with absolute powers in exchange for the protection of life. For Hobbes, the inclination to survival as the first of man’s desires replaces happiness, in the classical sense.
Now as the basic protection of life is the sole criterion of legitimate authority, it follows that the only criteria for a legitimate regime is protection of man’s survival as such and its power to maintain itself against attempts at rebellion or conquest. Thus the definition of rebellion itself goes through a fundamental change — there can be no such thing as a successful rebellion, for one regime which overpowers another is entitled to the power to rule which it achieves through its victory, which also means that the previous regime was unsuccessful both in maintaining its own right to power, as well as having the power to protect its citizens. Through its success, a rebellion justifies itself in its very act, and thus cannot be questioned.
Students of political philosophy will recognize a very strong resemblance in the picture of man Hobbes paints to that which Thrasymachus depicts in Plato’s “Republic.” According to the definition of justice Thrasymachus provides, justice is nothing but the commands of the ruler to his own benefit. Following Socrates’ refutation of this definition in Republic Book I, Glaucon and Adeimantus charge that Socrates has refuted Thrasymachus’ argument but has failed to prove that justice is to be sought for its own sake. They thus propose to revive Thrasymachus’ argument — so that Socrates might refute this stronger thesis and prove to them their innate belief that justice is better than injustice — and support it with the claim that injustice is advantageous and justice harmful to the individual. In order to illustrate this claim, Glaucon uses the example of the fictional farmer Gyges, who, upon discovering a magical ring, that rendered him invisible upon wearing it, uses its power to enhance his own. Gyges successfully seduces his queen, and the two of them conspire to murder the king; upon the king’s death, Gyges seizes his throne and proclaims himself as the new ruler.
The moral underlying the story is that justice by itself is useless — people only pretend to be just in order to avoid being treated unjustly by their neighbors. If one person could act unjustly without being caught, they would do so. Hence justice is merely the status quo for those not wishing to be treated with injustice. It would be helpful to bear in mind here the image Hobbes paints of man as in a perpetual state of war, preceding his entrance into the social contract.
The picture that Plato provides through the illustration of Gyges bears striking resemblance to the doctrine Hobbes advances. The inclination of man, insofar as he wishes not to be molested by his neighbor, lies in his agreement not to abuse his neighbor, in either property or person. Thus the account which Hobbes provides nearly 19 centuries after Plato is hardly novel. Hobbes merely reiterates that powerful appeal this argument exercises over the mind, in that it possesses an ostensible ring of plausibility which other theories lack.
Yet Hobbes neglects mention of one important fact. An agreement among men presupposes that such conventions required for civilized discourse are already in place; a contract cannot take place unless the procedures for discussion among men exist before such discussions are under way. Hence, as men found in a war of all against all cannot be said to possess the required means to enter into civilized discourse, Hobbes’ picture of natural man would seem implausible, and to this extent his image would be anachronistic. Another feature of civilized man, which the very idea of civilization presupposes, is the complex interconnected set of relations that make up the social nexus of which each and every person is a part. Man, in his state of nature, as Hobbes describes it, is individuated and alienated from his peers to a degree that seems unrealistic in light of the social complexities required for the negotiation of an successful attempt at living in relative harmony with one another.
I think you’re giving Hobbes’ definition of justice the short shrift- he may be closer to Thrasymachus than is comfortable, but it’s considerably more lofty than what you’re painting here.
It all, again, begins from the state of nature. He asserts a natural right to all things in a world without a state to impose order, because all men have the natural right to protect themselves and their property. For the same reason that war may be justified in the current state of international anarchy, where there is no sovereign to impose the peace, theft and murder may be justified in the state of nature- because ultimately, if it is necessary to survive, it’s something that has to be done.
Ultimately, I think Hobbes’ argument hits on the same moral intuitions that allow us to claim that a thief who steals bread in order to prevent starving is not acting unjustly. If it’s a choice between respecting the rights of others or your very survival, I don’t think many of us will excoriate the person who chooses survival.
In any case, then, nothing is unjust in the state of nature. Justice is, however, the font of peace, and the critical implement in getting us out of that wretched state. Hobbes defines justice as nothing other than carrying out your agreed upon covenants (which includes the covenant you made with your sovereign and with society to obey and uphold the laws of the land). This justice is necessary for the social contract to function, and the social contract is the font of all good: only with the social contract can we avoid the innumerable evils of anarchy.
As to your rebellion example, Hobbes makes it clear that your obligation to a sovereign lasts only as long as his ability to protect you lasts. Nevertheless, while he possesses that power, you are obliged to follow him by virtue of the covenant you made with society. As odd as it sounds, I think Hobbes would insist that you follow the entrenched power in the event of a civil war, but if the opposition should win, your loyalties necessarily belong to them who are providing you with security.
I agree that the state of nature as depicted in Hobbes is unlikely to have ever occurred, but I also find the Garden of Eden depicted in Milton implausible. Which is to say, that I think both are better taken allegorically than literally. The state of nature is mostly a thought experiment of what would happen in the absence of a social contract, and the signing of that social contract is, in my opinion, better understood in mythological terms or even evolutionary terms (man being disposed to a social contract owing to the benefits of cooperation) than in literal ones.
Nevertheless, you’re absolutely spot on in much of your criticism. Chiefly, Hobbes doesn’t seem to put any weight on virtue, social ties, or felt obligation in social matters to impose order, or even of power wielded in ways other than a traditional state. I understand the impetus to divorce virtue from sound statecraft- you don’t, after all, want to rely upon the virtue of your citizens if you can absolutely help it, and this, as I see it, is the prime benefit of capitalism. Nevertheless, Hobbes’ willful ignorance of the power of social ties and the general human tendency to follow custom impoverishes his philosophy, in my opinion.
I would claim that Hobbes’ philosophy bears a resemblance to that of Thrasymachus insofar as both argue that the ruler has the right to rule provided that he has the power to maintain his rule. Hobbes’ argument is more complex than Thrasymachus’ insofar as he adds a further criterion of power — that the ruler provide for the protection of his subjects in their right to life. Though this would add another dimension to the consideration — and place some restraint on the power of the ruler, where in Thrasymachus’s conception of the state there is none — it does little to change the substance of the argument; that is, that power is the sole justification for rule, and hence for political morality.
Even in Thrasymachus’ case, there seems little to differentiate the two on the basis of the qualifications of the ruler. The unjust ruler does not abuse his power absolutely, as this would quickly incite his subjects to rebellion. The same for Hobbes. The most unjust man, as Plato argues, acts unjustly to the extent that he can, and at the same time he does his best to appear just. In substance, this would mean that he would care for his subjects insofar as he absolutely has to. I do not see how this is much better or worse than Hobbes’ system of government. For there, all that the monarch must needs guarantee is the protection of life. The subject has no right to complain whether the monarch imprisons him unjustly or takes from him his property, so long as he keeps him alive.